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INSIDER TRADING PRIOR TO HOSPITALITY
ACQUISITION PAYMENT TYPE ANNOUNCEMENTS
Seonghee Oak
and
William Andrew
ABSTRACT
This study examines evidence of whether hospitality insiders use personal private
information to maximize their private benefits prior to hospitality acquisition payment
type announcements. The findings of this study, with few exceptions, do not support the
hypothesis that hospitality insiders undertake abnormal insider trading using inside
information about the true value of the acquiring firm when an acquisition payment type
is announced. For hospitality acquiring firms using stock or cash financing to pay for the
acquisition, the level of abnormal insider transactions in the four quarters prior to an
acquisition payment announcement was not significant. However, for hospitality
acquirers using mixed financing (cash and stock), abnormal insider sales were positive
and significant in the four quarters prior to the announcement. The lack of significant
results for the all cash or stock payment announcements may reflect legal constraint on
insider trading, managerial control or compensation issues.
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Introduction
This study examines the effect of information asymmetry on insider trading
activities in hospitality firms when the firms announce a particular type of payment for
acquisition. In modern hospitality corporations, managers and shareholders may have
different information about the true value of their firm (Brealy & Myers, 2000). This
results in information asymmetry between the hospitality firm’s managers and the firm’s
investors that may allow the managers to obtain abnormal trading profits (at the expense
of investors) through purchases or sales of their firm’s stock based on the manager’s
private information (Rozeff & Zaman, 1998; Yook, Gangopadhyay & McCabe, 1999;
Lakonishok & Lee, 2001; Jenter, 2005).
In the case of a hospitality acquisition, the decision of how to finance the
acquisition may reveal the manager’s true perception of the value of their firm’s shares
(Shleifer & Vishny, 2005). In addition, rational behavior would be expected to
encourage a hospitality manager to exploit such information asymmetry (especially
where there are no other constraints, such as insider trading laws). In this situation, when
managers of an acquiring hospitality firm perceive the shares of their firm to be
overvalued, they may use those shares to pay for the acquisition and also sell their own
(overvalued) personal shares before the acquisition payment announcement is made
(Seyhun, 1990). When the managers of acquiring hospitality firms perceive their shares
to be undervalued, they may avoid using the firm’s shares to finance the acquisition and
instead finance the acquisition with cash (Seyhun, 1990). In this situation, to take
advantage of their prior knowledge of the firm’s true value, they would buy shares of
their firm before the acquisition payment announcement. When managers of acquiring
hospitality firms perceive their shares to be fairly valued (all other factors being equal),
they may be indifferent to using stock or cash to finance an acquisition and thus may be
more inclined to use a mix of stock and cash as payment. In this situation, there should
be no abnormal buying or selling on the manager’s personal account before the
acquisition payment announcement is made.
These various theoretical transactions by insiders in response to private
information about the true valuation of their hospitality firm presuppose that hospitality
managers are subject to no other influences on their behavior. However, securities law
requires managers to report their transactions to the SEC in a timely fashion in order to
prevent illegal insider trading around acquisitions (Meulbroek 1992; Ke, Huddart &
Petroni 2003). Hence, the results of this study may be influenced by how well the
regulation of insider trading deters the acquiring firm’s informed managerial trading prior
to the hospitality acquisition payment announcement.
This study empirically examines insider trading prior to acquisition payment type
announcements and represents the first formal examination of this subject in the
hospitality literature. Despite persistent debate over the level of market efficiency in the
financial markets and the importance of information asymmetry, none of the research in
hospitality has so far addressed the process of insider trading around hospitality corporate
events. In addition, previous hospitality research related to hospitality acquisitions has
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utilized an event study methodology where share price abnormal returns are calculated
for the acquiring firms and targets (Kwansa, F., 1994; Sheel & Nagpal, 2000; Canina,
2001). Since insider trading prior to acquisition payment type announcements has not
been examined in the hospitality literature, this study should help to define its importance
in a hospitality framework and may also offer insight as to the effects of such
announcement and related insider trading on hospitality firm shareholder value. Finally,
since hospitality firms tend to need to raise significant amounts of capital to finance their
operations, it is important that investors in hospitality firms have confidence that the
managers of these firms do not exploit their inside knowledge of the firm’s prospects at
the expense of the firm’s investors. This study should help to clarify this issue.

Literature Review
Several authors in the hospitality literature (Sheel & Nagpal, 2000; Canina, 2001) have
examined consolidation and acquisition activity by hospitality firms. Explanations such
as valuation, expense reduction, increased market power, increased economies of scale
and scope, reduced earnings volatility, reducing agency problems, and tax savings have
been suggested as reasons for such activity. Empirically, these studies have measured
market gains/losses around the acquisition announcement to test the effect of the
acquisition and consolidation activity on firm value. Using an event study methodology,
the studies showed positive short-term abnormal returns for both acquiring firms and the
target (Kwansa, 1994; Canina, 2001) but negative long-term cumulative abnormal returns
for the acquiring firms (Sheel & Nagpal, 2000). In contrast, this study examines the
behavior, prior to the date of the actual acquisition (payment type) announcement, of
hospitality managers with potential inside information. The methodology includes
comparing managerial buying/selling of their personal shares in the period prior to the
announcement with a three year base period established for control purposes four years
before the announcement. This different approach should help to supplement the existing
hospitality literature and offer another perspective on the hospitality acquisition process
(for comparison purposes, a long term event study analysis of the acquiring firm’s
performance by acquisition payment type has been included in Appendix A).
All of the studies have potential implications for the existence of efficient
markets. Fama (1970) first defined the efficient market hypothesis, which is a framework
for examining how information influences stock prices. If a financial market is efficient,
stock prices will fully reflect all available information and investors cannot consistently
beat the market. However, Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) developed the
impossibility of efficient market such that some investors remain uninformed. One can
attribute information asymmetry in hospitality acquisitions to a manager’s private
information about an acquiring firm’s economic value (Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker,
1992; Loughran & Vijh, 1997). Although managers in acquiring hospitality firms may
have information about the future prospects of the combined firms, outside investors do
not have access to that information. Thus it is possible that managers of hospitality
acquiring firms can use their private information to trade their firms’ shares on their
personal accounts and that this insider trading can lessen the market value of their firms
(Seyhun, 1990; Madison, Roth & Soporoschenko, 2004). In this case, the insider trading
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of the acquiring hospitality firm’s managers will be gains for the managers and losses for
the outside investors.
One can reduce this adverse selection problem with what is known as a “signal,”
which Spence (1974) defined as a manipulatable attribute or activity that conveys
information. Several signals appear prior to acquisitions, and they include insider trading
and the type of payment offered to the target. The type of payment—cash, stock or
mixed—constitute a signal in an acquisition announcement, reflecting the manager’s
perception of the overvaluation or undervalution of a firm (Seyhun, 1990). For example,
if managers of acquiring firms perceive an overvaluation of their firm’s shares, they
would be motivated to use stock to pay to the target. When the managers pay with
overvalued stock, the cost of acquisition will be reduced by the amount that the shares are
overvalued. Thus if a hospitality acquiring firm undertakes an acquisition paying with its
own stock, this suggests that its managers perceive the economic value of that stock to
be lower than its market value (Brealey & Myers, 2000). The reverse is likely to be true
for a cash financed acquisition i.e., if managers perceive an undervaluation of their firm’s
shares, they would be motivated to pay in cash. Previous (non-hospitality) research does
offer indirect support for this idea by showing that the subsequent performance of an
acquiring firm is related to the type of payment offered in an acquisition. For example,
several studies have shown that a cash offer from an acquiring firm produces a more
favorable long-run announcement effect than does a stock-financed offer (Agrawal, Jaffe
& Mandelker, 1992; Loghran & Vijh, 1997; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998).
Private information presents hospitality insiders with opportunities for personal
trading (Rozeff & Zaman, 1998; Lakonishok & Lee, 2001; Jenter, 2005). If hospitality
insiders have private information, they can use it for their private benefit–namely, to
make positive abnormal returns on their investment portfolio. Insider trading by an
acquiring hospitality firm’s managers can also signal a manager’s perception of her
firm’s performance after the acquisition. In the case of a hospitality acquisition payment
type announcement, knowledge of the difference between the market and the economic
value of the acquiring hospitality firm prior to the announcement can give insiders an
opportunity to trade their own shares advantageously (Seyhun, 1990).
Empirical tests suggest that managers often know their firm’s stock price
movement in advance and behave proactively. Finnerty (1976) found that during an
eleven-month holding period, insider purchases of their firm’s shares produced positive
excess returns for the insiders while insider sales of their firm’s shares enabled them to
avoid negative excess returns. Seyhun (1986, 1990) demonstrated that insiders tend to
rely on private information to govern their transaction timing. While insiders purchase
their firm’s stock prior to an abnormal rise in stock prices, they tend to sell it prior to an
abnormal decline in stock prices. Seyhun showed that during the 100 days subsequent to
the insider trading day, abnormal returns on insider selling portfolios were negative, and
abnormal returns on insider buying portfolios were positive. Seyhun also showed that in a
takeover, bidder managers make more prior insider purchases when the stock price
reaction to the takeover announcement is large and positive than when it is large and
negative. Seyhun, therefore, concluded that managers in acquiring firms generally time
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their transactions to sell before stock-financed acquisitions and to purchase before cashfinanced acquisitions. Likewise, Yook, Gangopadhyay and McCabe (1999) showed that
insiders of acquiring firms tend to sell before stock offers relative to before cash offers.
In addition, their study reported that cash offers have higher abnormal returns on the
acquisition announcement date than stock offers.
More recent insider trading studies support the fact that insiders undertake trading
based on their private information of firm’s fundamental value and in a manner to avoid
legal constraints on their trading. Insider sales increased three to nine quarters prior to
announcements that earnings in the current quarter were less that earnings for the same
quarter of the previous year (Ke, Huddart, Petroni, 2003). Ke’s study also showed that
insiders have timely trading strategies for avoiding civil and criminal liability. For
example, in bank mergers, the targeted bank insiders significantly decreased both insider
sales and insider purchases one year prior to the merger announcement (Madison, Roth &
Saporoschenko, 2004). Insiders may also, in general, time their purchases and sales to
their perception of the value of the company even in the absence of significant corporate
events. Insiders in low valuation firms (value firms) may buy their shares and insiders in
high valuation firms (growth firms) may see advantages in selling their shares (Rozeff &
Zaman, 1998; Lakonishok & Lee, 2001; Piotroski & Roulston, 2003; Jenter 2005). This
general insider trading has been shown to be consistent with the subsequent market
movement of the firm’s share price (Lakonishok & Lee, 2001).
All of these studies imply that there may be a tendency for hospitality managers
who have knowledge about the true valuation of their firm’s shares to trade the shares for
their own personal benefit prior to acquisition payment type announcements. This study
will offer evidence as to whether this may be the case and under what circumstances such
trading occurs.

Insider Trading Regulation
Although the government regulates insider trading to keep private information
from penalizing the uninformed investor, insider trading can still adversely influence
stock prices in the financial market. While economists Calton and Fischel (1983) long
ago defined insider trading as “a transaction by those better informed than their trading
partners,” insider trading in a legal sense is “a transaction within a six-month period prior
to corporate events based on material information held by insiders or their tippers (Calton
& Fischel, 1983)”. Material information means that “reasonable investors would
consider the information important to their investment decisions (Meulbroek, 1992).”
Until 1980, neither the corporation nor an investor trading on the opposite side of an
insider transaction had any legal remedies against the insider. Only common law rules
allowed suits against insiders for trading, and “the strictures of contract law applied only
if the plaintiff could prove such special facts as misrepresentation of the security value
(Calton & Fischel, 1983).”
Insider trading regulation became much stricter by statute after 1980, and anyone
with material and confidential information about a firm could no longer trade its
securities prior to corporate informational events. The Insider Trading and Securities
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Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA)
The Sample of Acquiring Hospitality Firms created a reward program to insider
trading informants, made top managers bear responsible for employee’s illegal trading,
and raised criminal penalties (Ke, Huddart & Petroni, 2003). But despite the strict
regulation of insider trading since 1980, there is little evidence that the increased
enforcement of insider trading sanctions has actually deterred insider trading (Seyhun,
1992). This failure in the statutes appears to reflect a lack of congressional oversight,
high insider trading frequency, diverse insider trading schemes that escape legal
definition, and the high legal costs of proving insider trading. In addition, “safe harbor”
rules that enable insiders to avoid any risk of insider trading liability, allows employees
to file selling plans with the SEC and to sell their stocks regularly on a set date. This
arrangement enables insiders to sell their stock legally prior to corporate informational
events (Shell, 2001). The study presented here does not distinguish illegal trading from
legal trading prior to acquisition payment announcements in the hospitality industry.
Rather, it analyzes all insider trading at least one year before the public acquisition
payment announcement.

Data
This study examines payment type announcements by acquiring hospitality firms
which bought either public or private hospitality firms. To identify those acquiring firms
with a public hospitality target, the authors first identified target hospitality firms
delisted from a stock exchange and then searched to find the matching acquiring firms.
The authors used the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes for all NYSE,
AMEX, and Nasdaq hospitality firms (SIC industry codes: hotel 7011, restaurant 5812,
casino 7999, and cruise 4481) delisted during the 1983-1999 period. The CRSP tapes
assign firms that are delisted because of being acquired a delisting code between 200 and
203. After identifying the delisted firms (targets), the authors consulted the Wall Street
Journal Index to determine the acquiring firms.
To collect acquiring firm data where the target was a private hospitality firm, trade
magazines like Hotel & Motel Management and National Restaurant News were used. In
addition to these sources, the Mergerstat Review and the Merger Yearbook was used to
identify additional acquisitions in the hospitality industry not found in the other sources.
The search for acquiring hospitality firms buying either private or public hospitality
target firms produced a total of 111 observations between 1983 and 1999. The authors
divided this sample of acquiring firms into three subsets based on the acquisition
payment type (cash, stock and mixed) as reported in the Dow Jones News Service
(DJNS). If the payment type for the observation was unknown, the acquisition was
excluded from this study. This reduced the sample size from 111 announcements to 80
(the time period of acquisition announcements in the reduced sample ranged from 1988
to 1999). The first sample subset consisted of the stock-payment group (where only the
acquirer’s common stock was used to pay for the acquisition) and contained 35 of the 80
observations. The second sample subset consisted of the cash-payment group (where
only cash was used to pay for the acquisition) and included 20 of the 80 observations.
The last sample subset consisted of the mixed-payment group (where both cash and stock
were used to pay for the acquisition) and contained 25 of the 80 observations (see
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Insider Trading Data
Appendix B). The event date for the acquisition payment type announcement was taken
as the first date of the acquisition payment announcement on the DJNS (Ahn, Cao &
Choe 2001). The event date for majority of sample (75 of the 80 observations) was the
same day as that of the first public announcement of the acquisition.
The authors obtained insider trading data on the 80 observations in the sample from
First Call Insider Research for the period 1984 to 1999 (although the empirical sample
period starts in 1988, it is necessary to have the data four years prior to establish an initial
control period. See page 13 for specific details). First Call Insider Research compiled
the information from the original SEC filings. The SEC defines an insider as an
executive, officer, director, or any individual in a policy-making position or a beneficial
owner (holder of 10 percent or more of the stock). This study excluded beneficial owners,
a measure consistent with previous insider trading studies (Kahle, 2000; Clarke, Dunbar
& Kahle, 2001). This is also supported by Seyhun (1986) who suggested that trades by
principal shareholders who are neither officers nor directors convey comparatively little
information.
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A time lag occurs between insider transactions and when insiders report their
transactions to the SEC. Several previous studies used the day of filing insider
transactions to the SEC as the insider trading day (see, for example, Clarke, Dunbar &
Kahle, 2001). In this study, however, we use the actual trading date of the insider
transaction, consistent with Seyhun (1990). Using the actual trading date may reduce
errors attributable to delayed reporting since managers may use the delayed disclosure
provision to unload shares when they foresee bad news (Cheng, Nagar & Rajan, 2003).
Under Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, insiders are required to
report any transaction to the SEC on Form 4 by the tenth of the month following the trade
(Cheng, Nagar & Rajan, 2003). Those insiders who have had exempt transactions and
have not reported on Form 4 are required to file annually through Form 5 (Cheng, Nagar
& Rajan, 2003).
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This study used data on hospitality officers’ and directors’ trading during the period
prior to an acquisition payment announcement. Abnormal insider trading was calculated
by comparing insider trades in the study period (four quarters prior to the announcement)
with insider trades in a control period of 36 months (beginning 48 months prior to the
acquisition payment announcement and ending 12 months prior to the announcement). In
addition, this study used only open-market stock transactions to determine insider sales
and insider purchases (Kahle, 2000; Clarke, Dunbar & Kahle, 2001). The other types of
transactions excluded from this study (such as exercising options and selling warrants)
generally account for only 10 percent of total insider transactions (Meulbroek, 1992) and
may also be influenced by the firm’s compensation policy (Madison, Roth &
Saporoschenko, 2004).
Finally, five observations from original twenty observations in the cash sample were
excluded from the analysis because they produced no insider transactions in either the
control period or the period one year prior to the acquisition announcement. Thus the
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cash sample size was reduced to 15 observations and the overall sample to 75
observations.
The remaining sample of acquiring firms has the following industry distribution: hotels
(20 observations), REITs (14 observations), restaurants (32 observations), casinos (7
observations), cruise lines (1 observation) and country clubs (1 observation). Although
it would be interesting, an analysis by each industry segment was not possible due to the
small sample sizes.
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Using the LexisNexis database, the authors checked whether any insider in the entire
sample of acquiring firms has been charged with insider trading by the SEC in a civil or
administrative case. There was only one insider trading case among the acquiring firms
in the sample. In 1994, the secretary to a Hilton director provided inside information
(Hilton’s plan of hiring an investment bank to facilitate its expansion plans) to a British
man previously charged by the SEC. The secretary paid $10,000 to settle the charges.
The British man was charged with a fine of $458,458 (Wall Street Journal 1995).
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Methodology
Kahle (2000) suggests that two valid measures of insider trading are the number of
times insiders trade (a trade-based measure) and the number of shares traded (a volumebased measure). This study used the number of times hospitality insiders trade their
firms’ shares, weighting what each insider buys or sells equally, regardless of the number
of shares involved. Three reasons account for this choice. First, Clarke, Dunbar and
Kahle (2001) reported that the number of times insiders trade (trade-based measure) and
the number of shares traded (volume-based measure) produce the same results with
regard to insider trading. Second, the optimal size of an information motivated trade may
be medium to small if expected legal penalties increase with the size of the trade. Third,
share price changes should be related more to the number of insider purchases and sales
than to changes in the proportion of the firm held by the managers (Bradford, 1987).
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This study used hospitality insider trading in the four quarters before an acquisition
announcement to determine insider trading patterns (consistent with Clarke, Dunbar &
Kahle (2001)). Annual abnormal sales (purchases) were calculated. They are defined as
actual sales (purchases) minus expected sales (purchases) in the given year, where
expected sales (purchases) are the mean annual sales (purchases) of that firm in the 36month period beginning 48 months prior to the acquisition payment announcement. The
authors used this procedure to calculate the abnormal number of sales and purchases per
firm for the year prior to the acquisition payment announcement.
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Since insiders are under some legal constraints in regard to trading on their own
account during the six month period prior to an acquisition, the abnormal number of sales
and purchases per quarter during the 1 year period prior to the acquisition payment
announcement were also calculated for each acquiring firm. Quarterly abnormal sales
(purchases) are defined as actual sales (purchases) minus expected sales (purchases) in
the given quarter, where expected sales (purchases) are the mean quarterly sales
(purchases) of that firm in the 36-month period beginning 48 months prior to the
acquisition payment announcement.
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T-tests were used to measure the significance of abnormal insider sales and
purchases. The level of significance (that actual trading is different from expected
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Insider Trading Prior to Cash-Financed Acquisition Payment Announcements
trading) is reported at the ten-, five-, and one-percent levels. Since the authors intend to
measure whether abnormal insider sales and purchases are greater than those in the
control period, the p-values are calculated using a one tail test.
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Results
If managers of acquiring hospitality firms feel that their shares are undervalued, they
have an incentive to use cash to pay for an acquisition and likewise to purchase their
firms’ shares on their personal accounts prior to a cash acquisition financing
announcement. This would suggest that positive abnormal insider purchases occur prior
to cash-financed acquisitions. Our results do not support this. Table 1 shows insider
trading results for the period one year prior to the acquisition (quarters -1 to -4) and also
for each of the individual four quarters within that year (quarters -1, -2, -3 and -4).
During the one year prior to the cash financed acquisition announcement, the t-statistic of
abnormal insider purchases is insignificant. This implies that insiders in acquiring firms
did not, on average, make an unusual number of purchases in the one year prior to the
announcement.
Table 1 also presents the quarterly abnormal insider purchases for the one year prior to
the acquisition payment type announcement. This is important because insider trading
may be concentrated from 6 to 12 months prior to the announcement to avoid insider
trading legalities. However, the quarterly abnormal insider purchases are negatively
significant in the fourth (t-statistics = -1.580, p-value = 0.075) and second quarters (tstatistics = -1.450, p-value = 0.08) prior to the announcement (the other quarters do not
show statistically significant differences). The results imply that insider purchases during
the pre-acquisition period were less than during the control period which is the opposite
implied by the hypothesis that a cash payment offer should be associated with prior
increased insider purchases.
The results for cash-financed acquisitions may be interpreted in several ways. First,
the managers of acquiring firms are aware of and adhere to the legal constraints on their
trading. Second, it is also possible that cash-financed acquisitions are made for reasons
other than a perceived undervaluation of the acquiring firm. If acquiring hospitality firms
have cash available after all wealth-enhancing investments have been made, managers
may use that cash to undertake transactions to increase their own utility rather than to
maximize shareholder wealth. For example, managers may choose to grow their firms
through (non-value optimizing) mergers since executive compensation tends to relate
positively to firm size (Jensen, 1986; Harford, 1999). In fact, Qiu (2004) reported that
even the presence of institutional investors (insurance companies, mutual funds and
banks) and managerial ownership did not prevent value-reducing acquisition. A third
possibility that might explain our results is that hospitality managers may decide to use
cash-financed acquisitions even when the managers consider their stock overvalued
because stock-financed acquisitions would dilute their managerial control and power in
the newly combined firms (Martin, 1996).
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Insider Trading Prior to Stock-Financed Acquisition Payment Announcements
If managers of acquiring hospitality firms feel that their shares are overvalued, they
have an incentive to use company stock to pay for an acquisition and likewise to sell their
firms’ shares on their personal accounts prior to a stock financed acquisition payment
announcement. This would suggest that positive abnormal insider sales occur prior to
stock-financed acquisitions. Our results do not support this. Table 2 presents abnormal
insider sales in for one year and on a quarterly basis prior to the stock acquisition
payment type announcement. During the one year prior to the acquisition payment
announcement, the t-statistic of abnormal insider sales is insignificant (p-value= 0.28).
This implies that insiders in hospitality acquiring firms do not, on average, make an
unusual number of sales in the one year prior to the announcement of a stock financed
acquisition.
In addition, Table 2 shows that quarterly abnormal insider sales are negatively significant
(at the 1 percent level) in the three of the four quarters prior to the announcement. This
implies that the pre-acquisition period insider sales in the three quarters were less than
those during the control period. Again, this is in direct opposition to the hypothesis that
abnormal insider sales should increase prior to a stock financed acquisition payment
announcement.
These results may have several possible explanations. First, instead of open
market sales, hospitality insiders with private information may pursue short-sales
transactions to maximize their private benefits. Insiders could try to sell short prior to the
acquisition announcement believing that the stock’s price will fall and they can then buy
the stock back at a lower price after the acquisition payment announcement. These
transactions would not show up in the abnormal insider sales transactions. Christophe,
Ferri and Angel (2004) provide evidence that abnormal short-sales are significantly
related to post-announcement stock returns. Second, a recent study on executive option
exercising has shown that insiders sell option acquired shares immediately to reduce their
exposure to their firm’s stock (Carpenter & Remmers, 2001). This may limit the number
of shares that insiders have available to sell when they feel that the firm’s shares are over
valued.
Insider Trading Prior to Mixed-Financed Hospitality Acquisition Payment
Announcements
If managers of acquiring hospitality firms feel that their shares are fairly valued, they
should be indifferent, ceterus paribus, to using cash or company stock to pay for an
acquisition (and hence may use both) and likewise should lack an incentive to either buy
or sell their firms’ shares on their personal accounts prior to an acquisition payment
announcement. This would suggest that no positive abnormal insider sales or purchases
occur prior to mixed financing (cash plus stock) hospitality acquisition announcements.
Our results support this for insider purchases. Table 3 presents abnormal insider
purchases one year and on a quarterly basis prior to the acquisition payment type
announcement. During the entire one year period prior to the announcement, abnormal
insider purchases are insignificant (p-value = 0.165). This implies that insiders in
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acquiring hospitality firms did not, on average, make an unusual number of purchases in
the one year prior to the announcement. However, it should be noted that for the one
quarter period prior to the announcement, abnormal insider purchases are negatively
significant (at the 10 percent level), implying that there are fewer insider purchases than
during the control period. However, this may simply be due to hospitality insiders
avoiding the legal constraints against insider trading during this period.
For insider sales prior to a mixed financing acquisition announcement, we do find
significant abnormal insider sales of stock in the one year prior to the payment
announcement. In table 4, the p-value for abnormal insider sales is significant (at the 5
percent level) during the one year prior to a mixed acquisition financing announcement.
This implies that insiders in acquiring firms did, on average, make an unusual number of
sales in the one year prior to the announcement. Examining the quarterly data for that
one year period, all quarters except the one quarter prior to the announcement showed a
statistically insignificant level of insider abnormal sales. The first quarter prior to the
announcement did show a significant level of abnormal sales (at 5 percent level). These
may have been planned sales so as not to violate insider sales legal constraints.
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A possible explanation for the statistically significant abnormal insider sales over the
one year period prior to the payment type announcement in the mixed purchase sample is
that even though the acquiring firm’s managers perceive their shares as overvalued, they
may still use cash as part of the financing of the acquisition if their firm is particularly
cash-rich (Harford, 1999). Martin (1996) also suggests that managers may use some
degree of cash financing when their managerial ownership in the acquiring firm is in a
range from five to twenty-five percent in order to retain and maximize their managerial
control and compensation (Martin, 1996).
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The findings of this research on insider trading do not consistently support the
supposition that insiders in hospitality firms invariably use their private information to
maximize their private benefits prior to public acquisition payment type announcements.
These results may have several explanations, all of which present possible avenues for
future research. Securities laws may deter insiders of acquiring firms from exploiting
illegal insider trading profits. For example, in hospitality acquiring firms using only
stock or cash financing, there were no significant abnormal transactions in the one year
period prior to an acquisition payment type announcement. These results suggest that
the managers of acquiring firms do not trade on their own account to take advantage of
privately held information about the true value of their firms in these circumstances and
that one reason may be to avoid the legal constraints on insider trading prior to major
information announcements. For hospitality acquirers using mixed financing, abnormal
insider sales are positive and significant (although purchases are not). This result may,
however, reflect attempts by managers to maximize their managerial control or
compensation rather than taking advantage, through personal trading, of private
information that they may have. In such a situation, some of these sales may have been
planned sales thus avoiding the legal impediments to sales during this period.
Even though the results of this study show a general lack of insider trading prior to an
information event like the financing of an acquisition, the study does make an important
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contribution to the hospitality literature related to insider trading. No previous studies
have focused on the area of insider trading in relation to hospitality firms. This study
offers support for the view, at least in terms of acquisition payment type announcements,
that hospitality managers do not use their private information to take unfair advantage of
less informed investors in the financial market place. Whether the manager’s motives are
a result of enforcement of insider trading laws or affected by other considerations such as
maintaining managerial ownership and control is a question for further study. In any case,
the results of this study should provide assurance to investors in hospitality firms that the
managers of their firms do not take unfair advantage of them (at least in the case of
acquisition payment type announcements) even when the managers may possess inside
information not available to other investors about the true prospects of their firm.
Additional research in this area might also look at the issue of free cash flow and
managerial acquisition financing decisions. If acquiring firms have significant amounts
of free cash flow they may have an incentive to use cash financing in an acquisition
regardless of whether the managers perceive the firm’s shares to be fairly valued or not.
Future studies into whether free cash flow is a significant variable in the acquisition
payment choice decision would be helpful.
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Table 1. Abnormal Insider Purchases Prior To Cash-Financed Hospitality
Acquisition Payment Announcements
t-test
standard
Pre-acquisition period Sample size Mean
deviation t-stat
p-value
Quarters [-1 to -4]
15
-0.860
8.820 -0.360
0.375
Quarter [-4]
15
-0.828
2.097 -1.580
0.075*
Quarter [-3]
15
0.189
2.200 0.330
0.380
Quarter [-2]
15
-0.678
1.807 -1.450
0.080*
Quarter [-1]
15
0.528
3.182 0.640
0.280
*: significant at the 10% levels
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Table 2. Abnormal Insider Sales Prior To Stock-Financed Hospitality
Acquisition Payment Announcements
Pre-acquisition
sample
Standard
period
size
Mean
deviation
Quarters [-1 to -4]
35
-1.620
15.940
Quarter [-4]
35
-0.200
6.200
Quarter [-3]
35
-1.610
3.648
Quarter [-2]
35
-0.190
5.597
Quarter [-1]
35
0.210
5.584
***: significant at the 1% levels

t-stat
-0.600
-0.190
-2.570
-0.200
0.220

t-test
p-value
0.280
0.470
0.012***
0.460
0.420

15
Table 3. Abnormal Insider Purchases Prior to Mixed-Financed Hospitality
Acquisition Payment Announcements
Pre-acquisition
Sample
standard
period
size
Mean
deviation
Quarters [-1 to -4]
25
3.090
15.740
Quarter [-4]
25
2.470
11.880
Quarter [-3]
25
-0.250
2.982
Quarter [-2]
25
0.257
3.090
Quarter [-1]
25
-0.438
1.518
*: significant at the 10% levels

t-test
t-stat
p-value
0.860
0.165
1.000
0.160
-0.410
0.350
0.400
0.360
-1.390
0.075*
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Table 4. Abnormal Insider Sales Prior to Mixed Financed Hospitality Acquisition
Payment Announcements
**: significant at the 5% levels
Deleted: ¶

Pre-acquisition
period
Quarters [-1 to -4]
Quarter [-4]
Quarter [-3]
Quarter [-2]
Quarter [-1]

sample
size
25
25
25
25
25

Mean
2.860
0.497
0.247
0.622
1.437

Standard
deviation
7.900
1.881
2.532
2.804
3.257

t-test
t-stat
p-value
1.770 0.045**
1.290
0.130
0.480
0.330
1.090
0.170
2.210 0.023**
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Appendix A
Post-Acquisition Performance of Acquiring firms
If an acquiring firm’s managers use stock to pay for an acquisition, previous studies
have shown that the acquiring firm has lower long-term abnormal returns than firms that
use cash payments (Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker, 1992; Loghran & Vijh, 1997). The
explanation that has been suggested is that in the long run post acquisition, the market
value of overvalued stock converges to its economic value with the consequence that its
abnormal returns are more negative than for cash payment offers (which assumes that the
shares of acquiring firms making cash payment offers are less overvalued than stock offer
firms).
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To measure the long-term post-acquisition performance of the acquiring firms, the
monthly closing prices of the stock for each acquiring firms is obtained from the CRSP
Monthly File. Following Sheel and Nagpal (2000), the sample period is defined as a 36
month period before and after the acquisition payment announcements (total of six years).
The event period ranges from six months before to 36 months after the announcement
date. The estimation period for measuring the expected return in the market is defined as
36 to seven months before the announcement date.
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To measure the long-term performance of acquiring firms, the market model was used
(Brown & Warner, 1985; Sheel & Nagpal, 2000). The market model specifies the linear
relationship between security j returns and returns on a market portfolio as:
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R jt = α j + β j * Rmt + ε jt
where R jt = the monthly return on security j over month t
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α j = expected value of ( R jt - β j * Rm )
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β j = Cov ( R jt , Rmt ) / Var ( Rmt )
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Rmt = the market return on the CRSP equally-weighted market index over day t

ε jt = random variable.
An estimation period is from trading month t-36 through trading month t - 7, with respect
to the acquisition announcement. The abnormal return ( A jt ) for the security j on month t
is defined as the difference between actual observations and estimated returns.
A jt = R jt - [ α̂ j + β̂ j * Rmt ], t = -6, -5, …0, 1, …, 36,
where α̂ j and β̂ j are estimates of α j and β j by regressing R jt on Rmt over the
estimation period preceding the event window. For the every month in the event period,
the abnormal return ( A jt ) is averaged to make the sample mean

AR jt =

∑

N
j =1

N

A jt
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where t is defined in trading month relative to the event day. N is the number of
securities in the sample. Over the interval of beginning with six months prior to and
ending with 36 months after the acquisition announcements, the cumulative abnormal
return ( CAR jt ) is

CAR jt =

∑

36
t = −6
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AR jt .

A nonparametric rank test (Corrado, 1989; Nicolau, 2002) is used to test the significance
of cumulative average abnormal returns within the event window. The rank test is
powerful even under highly nonnormal distributions and corrects the misspecification
problem of other parametric tests due to the event-date excess return variance increases
(Corrado, 1989). The rank test (Nicolau, 2002) is calculated by:
1 N 
1

K − (T + 1)
∑
i =1  i 0
N
2


Z=

1 T 1
∑
T t =1  N
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∑i=1  K it − 2 (T + 1) 
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2

N

where N = the number of securities, K it = rank of the abnormal returns in the time series
estimated for the security i, and T = the total number of months being observed.
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Table 5 shows that the cumulative abnormal returns of stock payment hospitality
acquirers (-117.47 %) decline more steeply than those of cash payment hospitality
acquirers (-80.11 %). The returns for mixed payment acquirers (-105.28 %) are between
those of the cash and stock payment acquirers. This is consistent with previous studies
(Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker, 1992; Loghran & Vijh, 1997) and supports that the
payment type offered in a hospitality acquisition is related to the valuation of acquiring
firm. It should also be noted that the event day (day 0) abnormal return sign is consistent
with the hypothesis that cash payments indicate undervaluation of the firm’s shares and
stock payments indicate potential overvaluation of the firm’s shares.
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Table 5. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for the event period
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Month

Cash

Mixed

AR t

Rank
test Z

CAR

AR t

Rank
test Z

Stock
CAR

AR t

Rank
test Z

-6

-2.72%

-0.58

-2.72%

-0.59%

0.10

-0.59%

0.12%

0.24

0.12%

-5

-2.45%

-1.07

-5.17%

-6.22%

-0.71

-6.81%

-7.91%

-1.10

-7.79%

-4

3.44%

2.110*

-1.73%

6.96%

2.210*

0.15%

4.30%

1.800$

-3.49%

-3

-2.59%

-1.03

-4.32%

-0.09%

0.31

0.06%

0.20%

0.58

-3.29%

-2

1.14%

0.55

-3.18%

-0.13%

0.50

-0.07%

-0.05%

0.48

-3.34%

-1

-3.95%

-0.85

-7.13%

2.35%

0.97

2.28%

2.91%

1.02

-0.43%

CAR

0

2.48%

0.70

-4.65%

1.69%

0.17

3.97%

-1.33%

0.11

-1.76%

1

-3.53%

-0.76

-8.18%

-2.77%

-0.57

1.20%

-1.77%

-0.17

-3.53%

2

-3.49%

-0.92

-11.67%

2.42%

0.68

3.62%

3.42%

0.78

-0.11%

3

1.00%

0.49

-10.67%

-0.56%

0.16

3.06%

-0.55%

0.23

-0.66%

4

0.81%

0.52

-9.86%

-3.78%

-0.92

-0.72%

-3.06%

-0.60

-3.72%

5

2.86%

1.11

-7.00%

-1.23%

-0.03

-1.95%

-0.58%

0.22

-4.30%
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6

-2.98%

-0.62

-9.98%

0.17%

0.52

-1.78%

0.21%

0.59

7

-1.70%

-0.53

-11.68%

-3.25%

-1.03

-5.03%

-5.71%

-1.42

-4.09%
-9.80%

8

0.79%

0.37

-10.89%

1.06%

0.33

-3.97%

-1.09%

-0.03

-10.89%
-16.31%

9

-6.67%

-1.30

-17.56%

-4.54%

-0.75

-8.51%

-5.42%

-0.84

10

-2.63%

-0.67

-20.19%

-7.02%

-2.04

-15.53%

-9.33%

-2.630*

-25.64%

11

-4.10%

-2.01

-24.29%

0.63%

-0.90

-14.90%

1.26%

-0.55

-24.38%

12

-3.83%

-1.12

-28.12%

-4.70%

-1.17

-19.60%

-4.51%

-0.98

-28.89%

13

0.08%

0.64

-28.04%

-5.56%

-1.02

-25.16%

-6.61%

-1.22

-35.50%

14

-0.19%

0.42

-28.23%

-4.51%

-1.15

-29.67%

-3.94%

-1.10

-39.44%

15

-4.31%

-1.25

-32.54%

-3.25%

-0.19

-32.92%

-4.38%

-0.39

-43.82%

16

1.34%

0.67

-31.20%

-2.32%

-0.65

-35.24%

-1.86%

-0.40

-45.68%

17

-3.89%

-0.92

-35.09%

2.55%

0.10

-32.69%

-2.15%

-0.17

-47.83%

18

-7.05%

-2.62

-42.14%

-0.41%

0.27

-33.10%

0.65%

0.31

-47.18%

19

-9.53%

-2.80

-51.67%

-5.05%

-1.01

-38.15%

-3.93%

-0.50

-51.11%

20

0.90%

1.03

-50.77%

-7.27%

-2.61

-45.42%

-9.27%

-2.750**

-60.38%

21

3.22%

1.08

-47.55%

-0.69%

-0.31

-46.11%

-3.51%

-1.04

-63.89%

22

-5.53%

-1.44

-53.08%

1.83%

0.82

-44.28%

2.31%

0.80

-61.58%

23

-7.28%

-1.76

-60.36%

-7.15%

-1.72

-51.43%

-7.80%

-1.990$

-69.38%

24

-5.18%

-1.13

-65.54%

0.46%

-0.02

-50.97%

2.27%

0.44

-67.11%

25

-4.39%

-0.65

-69.93%

-5.48%

-0.98

-56.45%

-7.33%

-1.33

-74.44%

26

-5.47%

-1.42

-75.40%

0.19%

-0.96

-56.26%

2.53%

-0.48

-71.91%

27

-0.58%

0.17

-75.98%

-5.81%

-1.52

-62.07%

-6.53%

-1.53

-78.44%

28

2.10%

-0.30

-73.88%

-0.76%

-0.21

-62.83%

-0.86%

-0.26

-79.30%

29

-1.17%

-0.71

-75.05%

-9.04%

-1.69

-71.87%

-7.29%

-1.10

-86.59%

30

-3.15%

-1.20

-78.20%

-4.09%

-1.34

-75.96%

-0.71%

-0.47

-87.30%

31

0.83%

0.40

-77.37%

-5.13%

-1.07

-81.09%

-3.94%

-0.69

-91.24%

32

-4.06%

-1.15

-81.43%

-6.98%

-1.35

-88.07%

-8.68%

-1.54

-99.92%

33

3.02%

0.38

-78.41%

-7.13%

-2.35

-95.20%

-4.51%

-1.58

-104.43%

34

0.73%

0.46

-77.68%

-9.59%

-2.64

-104.79%

-10.00%

-2.810**

-114.43%

35

-1.03%

-0.31

-78.71%

-2.02%

-0.25

-106.81%

-2.27%

-0.37

-116.70%

36

-1.40%

-0.70

-80.11%

1.53%

0.60

-105.28%

-0.77%

0.02

-117.47%

$, *, and ** : significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively at one tail test.
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Appendix B.
List of hospitality acquisition by payment types
Cash Payment

Acquirer
Caesars World Inc
Harrah’s Entertainment
Hollywood Park
Mirage resorts
HFS
Marriott international
Marriott
Collins Foods Unit
CKE restaurant
Carrols Corp
Perkins Family restaurants
Piccadilly Cafeterias Inc
Quality Dining
LaSalle Hotel Properties
Patriot America hospitality

Stock Payment
Acquirer
Harrah’s Entertainment
Hollywood Park
MGM Grand
CapStar Hotel Co
HFS inc
HFS inc
Hilton
Hilton
Hudson hotels corps
prime motor inn
Prime Hospitality
Promus
Doubletree
Microtel Franchise
Apolena Capital Corp.
Applebee’s international inc
Apple South Inc
Manhattan Bagel
Daka International

Target
Caesars New Jersey
Showboat Inc.
Casino Magic
Boardwalk Casino
Jackson Hewitt Inc.
Forum group Inc.
Renaissance
Del Taco
Advanced Unit
PolloTropical Inc
Restaurant Co.
Morrison Restaurants Inc.
Grady’s
San Diego Princess Resort
Arcadian international Inc.

Target
Rio Hotel & Casino Inc.
Boomtown Inc
Primadonna
American General Hospitality Corp.
Casino & Credit Services Inc.
CUC International
Bally’s Entertainment
Grand Casinos Inc.
6 limited partnership
Cindy’a Inc
Homegate Hospitality Inc.
Double Tree
RFS Inc.
Hudson Hotels Corp.
Casino Creek Holdings
Pub Ventures
DF & R
I & J Bagel
Champps Entertainment
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Brinker International
Brinker International
Brinker International
GB foods
Hometown buffet
Longhorn Steaks Inc
Quality Dining
Servico inc
Shoney’s
Outback Steakhouse
Taco Cabana Inc.
FelCor Lodging Trust Inc
Hotel Investors Corp.
Humphrey hospitality trust
Patriot America hospitality
Extended Stay America

Border Café
Northwest Restaurant Inc.
Lettuce Entertain You Enterprise
Timber Lodge
Buffets
Bugaboo Creak Steak House
Brugger’s
Impac Hotel Group
TPI Enterprises Inc.
Lousiana Outback Steakhouse Inc. five Units
Two Pesos Inc.
Bristol Hotel Co
Hotel Properties Inc.
Supertel Hospitality
Wyndham Hotel
Studio Plus Hotels Inc.
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Mixed Payment

Acquirer
Nashville Country Club
Royal Caribbean International
Marriott International
Bristol Hotels
Doubletree
Wyndham
Apple South Inc
Boston Chicken Inc
Boston Chicken Inc
CKE restaurant
CKE restaurant
Koo Koo Roo Inc
Laundry’s Seafood
New York Bagel Enterprises
Bally Manufacturing Corp.
Chart House Enterprise
Apple South Inc
Starwood Lodging trust
Boykin lodging
Starwood Lodging trust
Starwood Lodging trust
Jameson Inns
Meditrust
Patriot America hospitality
Patriot America hospitality

Target
Avalon Entertainment
Celebrity Cruise Lines Inc.
Execustay Corp.
60 properties of Holiday Inn
Red Lion Inns
Clubhouse Hotels Inc.
Hops Grill & Bar Restaurants
Mid-Atlantic Restaurant Systems LP
Progressive Food Concepts Inc.
Summit Family Restaurants Inc.
Casa Bonita Inc.
14 properties of Hamlet Restaurant
Bayport Restaurant
Lots A’ Bagels Inc.
Golden Nugget Inc.
Paradise Bakery Inc.
McCormick & Schmick’s Restaurant
HEI
Red Lion Inns
Westin Hotels & Resorts
ITT Corp.
Signature Inns Inc.
La Quinta Inns Inc.
WHG resorts & casinos Inc.
Interstate Hotels
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